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ABSTRACT 
 
Denis Goulet (1931-2006) was probably the main founder of work on ‘development ethics’ 
as a self-conscious field that treats the ethical and value questions posed by development 
theory, planning and practice. This overview of a selection of papers presented at a 
conference of the International Development Ethics Association (Uganda, 2006) surveys 
Goulet’s work and compares it with issues and approaches in the selected papers. Ideas 
raised by Goulet provide a framework for discussing the set of papers, which especially 
consider corruption, professional ethics and the rights to water and essential drugs. The 
papers in turn provide a basis for comparing Goulet’s ideas with actual directions of work on 
development ethics. Rather than as a separate sub-discipline, development ethics takes shape 
as an interdisciplinary meeting place, aided though by the profile and intellectual space that 
Goulet strikingly strove to build for it.  
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1 - THE WORK OF DENIS GOULET 
 
The term “development ethics” emerged in the 1950s and 60s in intellectual circles around 
the French socio-economist Louis-Joseph Lebret (1897-1966) and the movement Économie 
et Humanisme which he had founded in the 1940s. Lebret worked extensively on a 
humanistic approach to international development. He “never tired of insisting that 
development was for ‘every person and the whole person’ (‘tous les hommes et tout 
l’homme’)” (Goulet 2000: 34). 
 
Lebret’s student and associate Denis Goulet (1931-2006) championed and extended the 
project of “development ethics” and “the ethics of development” into the Spanish, 
Portuguese, and English language literatures. In a publishing career of almost half a century, 
Goulet did perhaps more than any other individual to promote the notion of development 
ethics as a distinctive and vital area in thought and practice: in eleven books, such as Etica 
Del Desarrollo (1965), The Cruel Choice (1971a), The Uncertain Promise (1977), and 
Development Ethics (1995), over 160 papers, and inspiring personal contacts. Well before 
Sen, Haq and Nussbaum, he advocated that “authentic development aims toward the 
realization of human capabilities in all spheres” (Goulet 1971b: 205), and that economic 
growth and technological modernity must be treated as, at best, potential means towards 
considered human values, not vice versa. At the same time he insisted that principles of 
ethics and/or religion had to be confronted by and relate to the full realities and complexities 
of modern economies (Goulet 1960: 23). Goulet came to these perspectives through an 
ethnographic approach rather than centrally through reflection on welfare economics or 
Western moral philosophy. His core concepts were vulnerability and “existence rationality” 
(1971: viii). He had concluded early in his career that: “Every person and society wants to be 
treated by others as a being of worth, for its own sake and on its own terms, regardless of its 
utility or attractiveness to others” (Goulet 1975: 232). Not everything should be 
conceptualised as a commodity.1  
 
Denis Goulet was an American philosopher and social planner who came from an originally 
Francophone social background in New England. He spent one and a half years with poor 
and marginal groups in France, Spain, and Algeria during 1957-58, then studied and worked 
for three years with Lebret’s Économie et Humanisme group, in Paris and Lebanon. In 1960 
he published a paper entitled “Pour une éthique moderne du développement”, that has only 
recently been translated into English. It presented a manifesto for “a practical ethics of 
development” (Goulet 1960: 12) that would transcend the rupture between predictive 
political theory that had no interest in ethics and utopian normative political theory that was 
not grounded in real life; that would attend to the full development of persons (1960: 23) and 
not conflate the concepts of “goods” and “good”, or “having” and “being” (a contrast 
stressed by Lebret, among others); and that would give balanced attention to the 
                                            
1 The title for this special issue derives from Kuttner (1999). 
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responsibilities of each of “governments, private investors, owners and labour unions” in 
relation to the development of all of a country and of all countries (1960: 12).  
 
Goulet spent four years in various parts of Brazil in the early 1960s, undertaking PhD 
research followed by technical cooperation work. His first book, Etica Del Desarrollo, 
appeared in 1965 in Spanish and in 1966 in Portuguese (Etica Do Desenvolvimento). In the 
next twenty years he did field research also in southern Spain, Guinea-Bissau, Sri Lanka, 
Mexico, and again Brazil (Goulet 1992a). His most influential work, The Cruel Choice, in 
effect defined and consolidated a space for development ethics within English language 
circles of development policy and theory. The later part of his career, from 1979, was spent 
as Professor of Education for Justice in the Department of Economics at the University of 
Notre Dame in Indiana, a charismatic voice who bridged disciplinary and theory-practice 
gaps and contributed to the quest for understanding across an increasingly unequal world. A 
selection of his lifetime’s writings appeared recently as Development Ethics at Work: 
Explorations 1960-2002 (Goulet, 2006a). Many other papers are available on-line at 
http://www.nd.edu/~dgoulet. He died in December 2006. 
 
This special issue of Economics and Ethics is dedicated to Denis Goulet’s memory. It 
contains a set of papers from the Seventh International Conference of the International 
Development Ethics Association (IDEA), together with one paper from an earlier IDEA 
conference. IDEA was formed in 1987 and was much influenced by Goulet and his work. 
The 7th conference took place at Makerere University, Uganda in July 2006.2 
 
In this introduction and overview I outline the scope of work in the field called development 
ethics, including with reference to some of Goulet’s pioneering studies. I then outline the 
nine substantive papers in the special issue, and relate them to each other and to the agenda 
for development ethics proposed and exemplified by Goulet. He called for methodologically 
sophisticated ethical investigation and debate that are driven by experience, not primarily 
based in academic philosophy. The set of papers matches in good part his concerns for field-
based identification and reflection on values and value conflicts and on societal,  corporate 
and global responsibilities. At the same time the set illustrates how the field is moving ahead, 
combining case investigation with structured philosophical thinking, and seeking to connect 
to the triggers of action. 
 
 
2 - DEVELOPMENT ETHICS – ITS SCOPE AND PERSPECTIVE, AS REFLECTED IN 
THESE PAPERS 
 
                                            
2 Other collections of papers from the conference will appear in the Journal of Global Ethics and the 
African Journal of Ethics and Human Rights. We thank the local organising committee, led from the 
Department of Philosophy, for excellent hosting; in particular the committee’s chairperson 
Byaruhanga Rukooko and the conference manager Alice Wabule. Thanks too, for helping to make this 
collection possible, to Jerome Ballet; and to Raymond Apthorpe, Martin Doornbos, and Asuncion 
Lera for advice. 
Introduction: Working in Development Ethics: 
 a tribute to Denis Goulet 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 4 (2), 2006,  1 
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
4
2.1 The scope of development ethics: development focused, global, 
pluralistic, empirical as well as normative 
 
Goulet held that development ethics (DE) considers the “ethical and value questions posed by 
development theory, planning and practice” (1977: 5). Its mission, he proposed, is “to diagnose 
value conflicts, to assess policies (actual and possible), and to validate or refute valuations 
placed on development performance” (1997b: 1168). 
 
Development ethics is an untidy subject, about untidy and often unpleasant realities. In 
outlining an aspirant or emergent field, one seeks to specify a scope which has a good 
theoretical rationale and which at the same time finds a sufficient, interested audience. One 
cannot have a universal audience and so must ask: will anyone be listening and will they keep 
on listening? A field must be sufficiently distinctive and rewarding that enough people will 
listen and engage with it and continue to engage despite their limited time and the many 
candidates competing for their attention.  
 
Besides its manifest features—the foci on development, theory, planning, practice—Goulet’s 
indication of the scope of development ethics had a number of significant possible implications. 
I suggest the following implied features: 
 
-  The definition depends in turn on one’s definition of development. This could be an 
advantage: it means the definition can accomodate different views. Alternative bounds 
for DE include (each to be qualified by the Goulet definition): (i) “the South”; (ii) the 
South plus North-South relations; (iii) all nations (we then have “social progress 
ethics”)3; (iv) global relations and global issues, not merely inter-national ones; etc.  
-  DE may at the same time still speak especially to relatively definite audiences of 
development theorists/academics, funders, planners and practitioners, and their major 
clients, including students, rather than attempt to speak to everybody and as a result 
perhaps reach nobody. Insofar as DE has a restricted area it also becomes more 
manageable. If it tries to cover most of social ethics that might result in duplication, 
lack of focus, and over-abstraction. 
-  Even so, DE will still, like business ethics and medical ethics, cover issues at various 
levels: for individuals (in both their personal and professional roles), for 
organisations, for states and polities, and for the global polity. Like—or even more 
than—other fields of practical ethics, it should be grounded in intense observation of 
varied experience, not only the world as seen by the powerful; its normative 
discourses should be well related to empirical ones. 
 
In an intensively interconnected globe, where the quality and sustainability of the North’s 
“development” are also profoundly in question, there is strong logic in moving DE’s bounds 
from “the South” to social progress ethics in all nations, yet also danger of losing a focus and an 
                                            
3 Dower (1988) presents development ethics as the field that asks ‘How ought a society to exist and 
move into the future?’, as partner to the traditional field of personal ethics that asks ‘How ought one to 
live as an individual?’, and the emergent field of global ethics that asks the first question in terms of 
world society. 
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audience, and of losing a priority to the poorest. Goulet’s definition allows us to combine a view 
of DE as social change ethics (and global change ethics) with yet a relatively specific primary 
audience—those who recognize themselves as within development studies or development 
policy—and an acceptance that within that audience there are multiple definitions of the bounds 
of “development theory, planning and practice”. One can then have an audience, and a global 
orientation, and not lose a priority to poor people. This has been demonstrated, and good 
momentum achieved, by a sister stream within development ethics: that of human 
development, including the capability and capabilities work of Sen and Nussbaum; as well as 
probably by the great river of human rights work. Goulet’s own stream of development 
ethics remained small in comparison, perhaps due as we will see to the nature of his ideal for 
DE, to be a new sub-discipline. 
 
Goulet’s conception of development ethics, like that of Lebret or Peter Berger (1974), 
included strong attention to descriptive and explanatory ethics, done with more attention to 
dynamics than colonial ethnography gave. Development ethics must start from study of how 
people in a given setting think and seek to make sense of the world and their lives and the 
forces and choices that face them. For: “Any ethic—of development, of social practice, or of 
cultural reconstruction—is simultaneously an ethic of goals and a ‘means of the means.’ No 
extrinsic grafting of norms can truly work: norms must be drawn from the inner dynamisms 
of each arena in which they operate. At stake is the difference between hollow moralism and 
genuine ethical strategies.” (Goulet 1976: 40). 
 
This descriptive and explanatory ethics, the essential grounding for serious ethically based 
strategy, requires a particular sort of research methodology, argued Goulet (1971a). 
Following the French researcher Georges Allo, Goulet advocated “the need for observing a 
‘normative sequence’ when integrating the living experience of ordinary people with 
philosophical investigation and empirical social science research” (Goulet 1992b: 19). 
 
He held that “in the case of values, the ‘object’ studied has no intelligibility apart from its 
‘subjective’ resonances. …. [Further,]  Values belong to realms of synthesis, not analysis: 
their proper domains are philosophy, poetry, meta-analytical symbolism. Only under 
stringent conditions…is the study of values appropriate to social science. To reduce this 
synthesis of totality to that mere portion of reality which is measurable is to deprive life of its 
specificity and to falsify reality itself.” (Goulet 1971b: 208). 
 
His own resulting model of value systems and value change posited an existential core that 
must be respected and built from, and an outer zone of flexibility where adaptation is 
possible. 
 
“…to build development from tradition is the very opposite of reactionary. … Since 
the will of most Third World communities in anchored in the cultural values from 
which they derive their identity, integrity and sense of life’s meaning, there can be 
no justification for labeling a development strategy founded on the latent dynamisms 
in traditional, indigenous and local value orientations, as politically reactionary. On 
the contrary, the procedural commitment to respect values already in place 
constitutes a solid guarantee against falling in the twin traps of elitism and 
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manipulation. To design and build development on tradition and indigenous values 
is to espouse a philosophy of change founded on a basic trust in the ability of people, 
no matter how oppressed or impoverished, to improve their lives, to understand the 
social forces that affect them, and eventually to harness these forces to processes of 
genuine human and societal development” (Goulet 1987: 176). 
 
2.2  The scope of this set of papers 
 
The papers here fall into two main groups. They are connected by a concern for setting 
bounds to markets: to prevent acquisition of public office and execution of public duties 
from being market processes, in which the prizes go to the highest bidders; to prevent access 
to water and essential drugs from being purely on the basis of who can pay the free market 
price; to avoid the conception that the only duties of corporations are the maximisation of 
their own profits; and, in the background, to avoid the notion that there are no sustainable 
notions of rightness and goodness other than those of a contract which (albeit unequal) 
bargainers accept.  
 
The first group of papers can be seen broadly as about professional ethics: the priorities and 
practices of individuals who work in particular professions and roles, within development 
policy, planning and implementation. Normative professional ethics has perhaps not been 
highly prominent in self-styled development ethics, except for the area of development 
research. The work of Robert Chambers is one exception (e.g. Chambers 1993, 2005). The 
four—or, including Camacho’s, five—papers here in this category are by authors based in or 
from “the South”, and all have a national or (multinational) regional focus. Those by 
Hellsten, Mwanahewa and Alolo seek to describe and explain a shared ethical problem area: 
corruption in the public sphere in Africa. They contain some normative treatment too, 
judging and recommending, but their main emphasis is on understanding the divergences 
between formally acknowledged values and informally prevalent values and behaviour. Two 
other papers have a more normative character. Giddy examines whether or not mercenaries 
should be accepted as just another type of profession; and Camacho gives suggestions for 
training in professional ethics, based on a case study. 
Introduction: Working in Development Ethics: 
 a tribute to Denis Goulet 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 4 (2), 2006,  1 
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
7
 
 
 
MORE DESCRIPTIVE-
EXPLANATORY 
MORE NORMATIVE  
 
META-ETHICS 
ETHICS IN 
PROFESS-
IONAL AND 
PERSONAL 
CONDUCT 
 
Hellsten – leadership 
ethics  
 
Mwanahewa – on 
incongruent cultures 
 
Alolo – gender and 
corruption 
 
Giddy – what is a 
mercenary?  
 
 
Camacho – teaching 
professional ethics 
 
 
ETHICS IN 
POLICY  
 
 
Gasper (sections 5-6) - 
determinants of ethics’ 
influence on policy 
Bleisch – the right to water  
 
Banerjee – responsibilities 
to supply essential drugs  
 
Kreide – responsibilities of 
transnational corporations  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gasper (sections 
2-4) 
 
The second group of papers concerns policy ethics, which at least until recently has been 
more prominent in development ethics, including in much of Goulet’s own work.  Goulet’s 
model was very demanding though: the examination in depth of a project, programme, 
policy or even a national development strategy, identifying and reflecting on its multifarious 
value impacts; moving to an evaluation only through an in-depth description and attempt at 
understanding—as seen in his work on technology transfer, Mexico, Guinea-Bissau, Sri 
Lanka and Brazil. Some work by others is on similar lines (e.g. Porter et al. 1991, Richards 
1985); it requires exceptional inputs of sustained and wide-ranging attention, and is not 
readily funded. Mainstream work on value change, such as in the World Values Surveys and 
on the growth of consumerism or individualism, sometimes builds up sustained time series 
but is done through large periodic sample surveys and thus has a very different character. 
 
More work on development policy ethics has been directly normative, addressing urgent 
questions of choice, responsibility and priority, by application or extension of frameworks 
proposed as relevant from philosophical ethics. Compared to Goulet’s call for an 
existentialist ethnography, human-rights based approaches for example contain ready-made 
frameworks for observation, monitoring and evaluation and for contributing in policy design. 
Our set contains three papers in directly normative policy ethics, by Bleisch, Banerjee, and 
Kreide. (Giddy’s paper also has some of this character.) They happen to be authors based in 
the North, and all take a more global inter-national focus. They seek to establish principles 
concerning rights and responsibilities, including with transnational application. This has long 
been a central concern in development ethics, merging into global ethics, such as through 
theories of human rights. 
 
A final paper in the set, by Gasper, aims to complement the other papers by addressing 
worries that many potential readers or participants in development ethics feel: Is not ethics 
too obvious or else too subjective, too obscure, too indecisive and too uninfluential to be 
worth investing much time in? Together with Camacho’s paper on teaching ethics and this 
Introduction: Working in Development Ethics: 
 a tribute to Denis Goulet 
Éthique et économique/Ethics and Economics, 4 (2), 2006,  1 
http://ethique-economique.net/ 
8
introduction, Gasper’s paper can also be seen as part of a third group within the set, of papers 
that reflect on development ethics as an activity and movement, including in teaching, 
research and advocacy. The authors in this final group, one based in “the South” (Camacho) 
and one in “the North” (Gasper), are both associated with IDEA, the International 
Development Ethics Association.  
 
The overall set of papers thus illustrates a spectrum from micro-based to macro-focused 
work, and a variety of modes: descriptive, explanatory, evaluative, prescriptive, 
methodological. It illustrates too an evolution of topics in development ethics, from some 
very familiar to Goulet, like corporate responsibilities, to newer topics like the status of 
mercenaries and cosmopolitan law debates on the global application of human rights 
principles.  
 
2.3 The shape of development ethics: comparative, dynamic, intercultural, 
international, interdisciplinary 
 
Writing in the same spirit as Goulet, Mwanahewa proposes from his study of the concepts 
and causes of corruption in Uganda that, while much of the analysis internationally of 
corruption has had a generalised, universalist character, “it remains evident that the aspect of 
context, namely the meeting of the modern conventional and traditional, needs to be tackled 
… We can no longer afford to look at aspects of corruption and bribery as if the human race 
was one homogeneous lot.” (Mwanahewa 2006: 23). 
 
The papers in this collection have each a sense of time and place, whether in a particular 
national or regional location—East Africa, Uganda, Ghana, Costa Rica—or at the current 
global conjuncture of the emergence of capacities to provide clean water and essential drugs 
for everyone but the absence as yet of a working system of rights and responsibilities that 
will fulfil those possibilities. The subset on professional ethics in particular treats ethics in 
terms of feasibility and relevance within real cultural and historical settings, not some 
supposedly timeless “everywhere”. This context-specificity and the resultant comparative 
dimension are characteristic features in DE, though not universal in nor unique to it. Some of 
the classic moral philosophers, such as Aristotle and Hume, evinced this quality; others not. 
 
A further, related typical trait of DE is that it thinks within a world context. It starts from the 
inequalities and relationships within our world, as well as the related inequalities and 
relationships within its parts. And it deals explicitly with contexts in which markedly, even 
dramatically, different ethics coexist, and studies that coexistence, as here in the papers on 
corruption. Mwanahewa’s paper centres on the lack of coherence between the notions and 
practices found in the small-scale societies of what was brought together as Uganda and the 
notions and practices introduced by a colonizing world empire. He argues that this 
incoherence remains within present day Uganda. Such co-existences are not static. 
Development ethics examines change, often dramatic changes. Alolo writes in and of a 
world marked by international donor discourses and where foreign travel is something 
normal. Giddy addresses the phenomenon of mercenaries who operate on a global market, 
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given the very nature of their trade (he concludes that it does not deserve to be called a 
profession). Not only is a local market typically too small, but, he implies, killing strangers 
as a job fits more readily into a setting where one is foreign. Bleisch discusses the extension 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to the case of water, a campaign powered by 
global non-governmental and inter-governmental organisations. Bannerji and Kreide discuss 
the responsibilities for such rights, including transnational responsibilities and the 
responsibilities of transnational corporations. Gasper starts from the plurality of normative 
views in a plural but interacting world, and reviews what normative discourse can achieve in 
this reality, and how. Major advances in the past decade on some human rights fronts, and in 
campaigns for debt relief and for focus on priority basic needs fulfilment, show that 
persuasion and influence are at least sometimes possible.  
  
In sum, a characteristic development ethics perspective is: 1. comparative, 2. dynamic, 3. 
inter-cultural, and 4. inter-national. Goulet’s work exemplified all of these traits. If one 
contrasts such features with those of leading recent figures in Western ethics, does one finds 
many who would match it? Robert Nozick’s libertarian bible Anarchy, State and Utopia, for 
example, gave a fantasy scenario of societal dynamics (self-interested interactions creating a 
utopia) but little in the other respects. Alasdair MacIntyre was interested in comparison, 
change, and intercultural relations, but in nothing outside the North. John Rawls restricted 
his concern with inter-culturalism to within a Northern niche, and propounded a different 
model for matters of inter-national relations. One implication is that development ethics can 
bring valuable new insights for Western ethics, as we see from the work of figures such as 
Sen, Nussbaum or Bhikhu Parekh. A second possible implication is that a disciplinary nest, 
such as that of Western ethics, in which particular restricted and abstracted formulations of 
issues are pursued in great depth, also carries a danger of becoming a permanent cocoon 
from which the fledgling does not graduate. 
 
Goulet was emphatically for a form of philosophy which did graduate: “…for moral 
philosophers to stop ‘moralizing’ and undertake serious analysis of ethical problems posed 
by development, underdevelopment, and planning…they must go to the marketplace, the 
factory, the planning board, and the irrigation project and create ethical strategies of social 
decision-making which enter into the dynamics and the constraint systems of major policy 
instruments: political, technical, and administrative.” (Goulet 1988: 155). He never declared 
a moral position from on high, but based his advice on in-situ investigation, as well as a 
perspective of long-term change that had been informed by history, social science, and local 
immersion. Goulet moved beyond only highlighting the normative significance, and priority, 
of goals and criteria other than economic growth. He showed the centrality of such goals in 
motivating and guiding people’s behaviour; and he studied how to incorporate justified 
normative criteria into systems of decision-making. This moves development ethics’ centre 
of gravity from philosophy towards anthropology, psychology, sociology, economics and 
management.  
 
Yet, paradoxically, Goulet repeatedly called for development ethics to be a distinct discipline 
and specialism, a sort of secular priesthood (e.g., Goulet 1988, 1997). “The development 
ethicist” was the protagonist in many of his writings, which remained set in the mould of his 
1960s and 70s work: the development ethicist was a Goulet, engaged in technical 
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cooperation programmes or employed as a specialist researcher and adviser, a worker 
philosopher. Goulet’s own unusual career could not however be a generalisable model. His 
recommendation appears doubly paradoxical since he had at hand a far more plausible 
model, that of inter-disciplinary learning (Goulet 1992b), and was aware of the pitfalls of 
disciplinarity and the vested interests of existing disciplinary redoubts that do not let new 
competitors readily emerge. I have argued that the place for development ethics is not as a 
discipline or subdiscipline, but as an inter-disciplinary field in which a variety of relevant 
disciplines exchange and enrich each other (Gasper 1994). The authors in this set of papers, 
for example, come from not only philosophy, but also political science, medicine, economics 
and public policy. 
 
In his late work Goulet recognised “two different roads” in work on development ethics 
(1997: 1166). The first was his own model, of “a new discipline with distinctive methods and 
research procedures” (loc. cit.). The second road was of development ethics as a type of 
work that overlaps with other types, with which it cooperates as partners in interdisciplinary 
activity. This has been followed much more and is more realistic. An important number of 
development practitioners and social scientists have become more self-consciously and 
systematically ethics-oriented, for example through the growth of  rights-based approaches 
in the past decade or more. And the work in the marketplace, factory, planning board, and 
irrigation project has been done not by philosophers, but by ethically aware anthropologists, 
economists, geographers, health specialists, journalists, planners, political scientists and 
others. 
 
 
3. CORRUPTION: “DISEQUILIBRIUM OF DESIRE”, CLASH OF VALUE SYSTEMS, 
AND/OR THE PROFESSIONALISATION OF DESIRE FULFILMENT? 
 
The papers by Hellsten, Mwanahewa and Alolo form a closely connected trio. Each essays a 
realistic study of corruption in a part of Africa: Mwanahewa and Hellsten from East Africa 
(Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania) and Alolo from West Africa (Ghana). Each has expectations that 
what they have observed has wider relevance in Africa.  
 
Corruption is a classic topic in DE, related to its theme of the increasing intersections 
between diverse groups. Goulet held that exposure to the modernising powers of Europe and 
North America had disrupted an “equilibrium of desire” in pre-modern societies: not wanting 
and craving what is not widely attainable. Demonstration effects “remove[d] curbs on desire 
before providing individuals with the means to expand resources” (Goulet 1997a: 493; also 
Goulet 1971, Ch.3). This factor would not by itself explain corruption. What must also be 
removed are the constraints set by proscriptions concerning acceptable means, and other 
inhibitions to the pursuit of maximum desire fulfilment. 
 
Mwanahewa argues that the interface in (what became) Uganda, of a more powerful and 
sophisticated colonizer group and simpler, more intimate and small-scale societies, created 
social arenas in which the colonizers’ norms were meaningless or alien to the indigenous 
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people. Yet many of the colonizers’ other norms, regarding consumption and status, were 
rapidly absorbed, and, perhaps understated by Mwanahewa, a nation-wide environment was 
created above the small-scale societies, within which these groups competed for new prizes. 
Here again then, several factors are at play. 
 
Let us distinguish a series of factors, very likely complementary. Different theories of 
corruption place their emphasis or emphases differently within the series. 
 
1. “Disequilibration of desire”, Goulet’s view; the growth of demands by individuals, 
not just desires for the community as a whole 
2. The strangeness of the public sphere, in a new larger-scale society marked still by 
strong family and smaller-scale communal loyalties; a view explored by Hellsten 
and Alolo, and in part by Mwanahewa, as well as earlier by Goulet 
3. The creation of easier opportunities for corruption, via the imposition of Western 
notions of public office and other mechanisms, as proposed by Mwanahewa. Implicit 
in this view is also theory 2 and/or theory 4 below, so that ability to get away with 
corruption will be converted into real transgressions, especially when combined with 
factor 1, uncurbed desires.  
4. “Economic man”: if people have an opportunity for self-enrichment they take it. 
5. “Economic man is a man”: the now influential notion that men are more selfish and 
greedy than women, which is examined by Alolo. Her evidence supports the view 
that there are differences on average in male and female ethical reasoning, but shows 
that a conclusion that women in public service are less liable to be corrupt does not 
readily follow. Women may well be more subject than men to pressure to find ways 
to assist their family and friends. In her cases, theory 2 dominates; gender difference 
only brings different pathways of “corrupt” response. 
6. Institutional imbalance: new identities, of the professional and the citizen, and the 
corresponding peer groups, organisations and belief systems are as yet weakly 
evolved. This connects to matters taken up in Giddy and Camacho’s papers. 
 
Emphasising factor 2, the strangeness of the public sphere, Mwanahewa asks: “Why is it that 
many conventionally educated well-to-do people find themselves trapped in the vice of 
bribery? Could it be that the concept does not exist in their traditional cultures, accounting 
for its seeming absence in their conscience?” (p.3). “For when is a bribe a bribe and when is 
it a token of appreciation?”, an expression of a traditional norm of “something for 
something”. We can add though that often there is plenty of bribery also where the concept 
of bribery does exist, and without it necessarily troubling offenders’ consciences. Ethics and 
culture are not identical; norms that are acknowledged are not necessarily always respected.  
 
Mwanahewa harks back to a posited golden age in the Ankore region of Uganda, of 
internally harmonious communities where consensus ruled and the mutually acknowledged 
ethics were virtually always honoured. He emphasises factor 3, arguing that institutional 
arrangements—often—precluded bribery, unlike in later and current situations: “Decisions 
which were made were often collective decisions. Under such tight arrangements it was 
impossible to bribe a particular officer or councillor.” The picture arguably well reflects “the 
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characteristics of common sense in traditional cultures. These cultures are simple and 
undifferentiated or compact” (p.18). 
 
The paper alludes too to a series of other factors and situations. 
 
• First, interaction with other African societies. Reportedly the Ankore language had no 
word for bribery, and took the word it now uses from the neighbouring larger kingdom 
of Buganda (p.3). Societies often take words for grey or illicit activities from another 
society, to which the vice is attributed, thus flattering the taker. Probably Buganda was 
indeed a more complex society, although later it seems to be exempted too: “the concept 
and expression bribery did not exist in the peasantry or the peasant communities in 
Uganda and possibly many other communities in Africa and possibly beyond” (p.16). 
The growth of the practices and associated concepts of bribery in the various parts of 
Uganda is a challenging field for further historical research, given that the practices have 
found such fertile soil today. 
• Second, Mwanahewa highlights conceptual confusions between local systems and the 
colonial system, but points out that some of what he says—how vague stipulations 
concerning “adequate” compensation or “any other duties” provide opportunities for 
corruption—applies within any system, as he notes later for Britain (p.20).  
• Third, he observes that for some actors there is no conceptual confusion, rather an 
exploitation of opportunities. Postcolonial judges and managers, for example, inherited 
the wide discretion provided by vaguely, flexibly worded laws and regulations, without 
necessarily feeling constrained in the same ways as their predecessors; and were more 
likely to feel constrained instead by large social networks pressing for some share of the 
goods. 
 
Hellsten traces the impacts of such a combination of new objects of desire, external pressures 
and models, and a continuing “existence rationality” of strong group loyalties: 
 
“The main message sent through this new ‘global ideology’, to people who 
traditionally were either socialized or indoctrinated to believe in community 
solidarity and sharing, is that in order to survive in the midst of rapid globalization 
they need to adapt to individualistic promotion of self-interest, profit making and 
competition, while simultaneously maintaining traditional values as the backbone of 
local politics and social interaction. … ...the lack of strong state policies, efficient 
and reliable service delivery as well as the absence of impartial leadership and good 
governance has thus led many African transitional societies to a political reality 
which could be labeled ‘libertarian communitarianism’.” (Hellsten, p.12) 
“In the new economic and social context which mixes the imported individualist 
values with the traditionally more collectivist values, the societal ethics are turned 
around: one’s traditional social duties become part of the scope of one’s private 
morality and the individualist requirements of impartiality and autonomy are to be 
the basis of the public ethics….. In politics in many African societies, individualistic 
self-interest is now mixed with communal loyalties rather than with the public good 
of the nation as a whole” (p.13). 
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Leaders gain personal benefit not by good performance of public duties but by looting public 
office, while also looting it to benefit their support base. In “reverse ethics” the old values 
become the sources of crime and bias in the new society.  
 
Alolo adds, citing Price: “Social pressure in such societies, rather than permitting the 
separation of personal roles from official roles, demands that…personal criteria enter into the 
performance of official roles. Pressures of this kind come not only from the individual 
bureaucrat’s extended kinship group, but also from other members of his [or her] society, 
whose interaction with him [or her] is shaped by generalized personalistic expectations 
founded in [the] corporate nature of their society and culture” (Price, 1975: 30). Elaborating 
on theory 2 above, Goulet argued that more complex societies operate a division between 
social spheres, a meta-principle that different principles apply in different spheres—for 
example, that “something for something” is an exchange principle that must not be applied 
within the state. He suggested this division might not be easily adopted by simpler societies. 
 
“Men learn to conduct their business life as though money were the supreme value, 
while continuing to abide by other values in their private lives. Such normative 
schizophrenia creates great personal stress, it is true. But it has at least protected 
modern societies from bearing the full consequences of the values to which they 
subscribe in the realm of productive activity. Non-modern societies, on the other 
hand, are not psychologically prepared to dissociate economic values from more 
intimate value spheres. If economic achievement is portrayed to them as important 
enough to warrant casting off all other concerns—including their most treasured 
family and religious practices—then why should their quest for more goods be 
moderated by considerations of the rights of others, prior claims of needier men, or 
the need for austerity in consumption so as to build up a solid production base in the 
nation?” (Goulet, 1971: 223-4; italics in the original). 
 
Societies not steeped in such dissociation could move in practice to a value unitarism in 
which acquisitive and consumerist values become applied comprehensively, not only in 
restricted spheres, he feared. 
 
Theory 2 contains distinct elements. One concerns this difficulty of separation out of a public 
sphere with its own values different from those in family life and business life. Another 
concerns one justification for this sort of detached public sphere: the emergence of a more 
complex, plural society, not homogeneous in terms of groups and culture. Mwanahewa 
presents virtues of the traditional value-set, for its era; and argues the incoherence of the 
current value mix. If one accepted that analysis, it would not follow that the traditional 
value-set is feasible or sufficient for the current era, in a far larger-scale and more complex 
society where many previously separate communities are merged, as in Uganda. As Hellsten 
indicates, the problem thus involves not just the relationship between communitarian and 
individualist ethics, and not just the difficulty of dissociation, but the operation of a multi-
community larger society. She considers the modern reality of a nation with interwoven 
communities. “Corruption” meant originally: rottenness or disease, as in a sick or 
decomposing body. When the notion is applied to human behaviour within groups, which is 
“the body”? Which is the community? The set of personal intimates, the family, the clan, the 
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people of common place of origin, the ethnic group, the fellow-believers or like-minded 
thinkers, the nation-state, like-minded states, the world … ? 
 
Corruption’s causes alone—historical roots, current pressures—would not justify it. But as to 
how to respond, authors may agree on a situation report and a causal analysis yet draw very 
different policy conclusions; due for example to different judgements on what are the real 
options. Mwanahewa does not essay prescription. Alolo, like Hellsten, while mainly focused 
on description and explanation endorses in the end the modern conventional norms of strict 
public/private division, contrary to perhaps half of her interviewees. Hellsten opens with 
assertion of those classic Western formal norms for the public sphere; she sees the validity of 
some “realist” claims that leaders in the public sphere may need on occasion to diverge from 
conventional ethics, but judges that the “realist” stance as a whole can motivate an 
acceptance of disastrous venality and brutality.  
 
Giddy points to our factor 6—new identities and institutions as counterforces to corruption. 
He discusses the role of “overarching identity-giving narratives” of nationhood and 
citizenship and “the project of seeking how to integrate professionalism in traditional 
African culture” (p.5). His case study—of mercenaries—is extreme but illuminating, and 
highly germane in Africa. Large mercenary-services businesses play a major role in present 
day armed conflicts, most especially in Africa. Are they simply one type of professional or is 
there a problem in having for hire professional specialists in violence and killing? “To take 
the South African case, is the mercenary part and parcel of the new vision of an efficient and 
professional African culture, or should he or she be confined to the historical past along with 
the perpetrators of racist violence?” (p.7).  
 
Giddy concludes that the case of mercenaries exceeds the bounds of validity of the willing-
seller-willing-buyer paradigm. It spreads commercial values into a sphere where they are 
destructive; and it undermines the notion of citizenship and the nation-building project.  
 
“While South Africa has put a large emphasis on individual human rights and formal 
moral principles, there has also been a movement towards articulating and drawing 
upon a common ethical narrative, on nation-building. It is only within the latter 
context that principles are actually motivating, and that professions will preserve and 
expand their integrity. In a commercial society and utilitarian moral climate the 
external goods of competition will [otherwise] tend to become all-motivating, 
eclipsing the internal goods and corrupting the professions.” (Giddy, p.11) 
 
Mercenaries become “justified” by the presence of the selfishness and conflict that they help 
to bring and sustain. There is very little evidence for a Nozickian rather than Hobbesian 
scenario in a world of purely selfish individuals. 
 
4. WOULD BASIC RIGHTS, SUCH AS TO CLEAN DRINKING WATER AND ESSENTIAL 
DRUGS, IMPLY ANY CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES? 
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Giddy’s paper connects us to a second characteristic swathe of development ethics: less 
focused on the duties and actions of individuals, more concerned with the priorities and 
responsibilities of public agencies. Is drinking water a human right? Is a corporation a 
mercenary body, or has it wider social responsibilities? A corporation is not a government, 
nor a lawmaker; what could its societal duties be, including in world society, other than to 
respect the laws? The character of the papers in this second half is more distanced and 
generalized, the view from in and around policy-making centres: no individuals appear and 
the papers are on the whole more abstract and normative. The papers by Bleisch and Kreide 
in particular are based in philosophical literatures. All the papers pay attention also though to 
the actual configuration and capacities of actors. 
 
The ongoing human rights revolution has underlined that human rights entail a set of 
responsibilities to or for each other:  
 
• responsibilities for all to respect others’ human rights, not violate them;  
• responsibilities for some to protect human rights, against violation by others; and  
• in some other cases responsibilities to promote and fulfil the rights.  
 
The first strand in human rights thinking brings responsibilities for all, and is fundamental, 
as Kreide’s paper emphasises. Violation with often zero compensation paid has been normal 
in the past, not exceptional, for example in cases of industrial pollution of water supplies. 
For the second and third strands we must answer though: which responsibilities precisely, 
falling on which people to protect or assist which other people?  
 
Bleisch’s paper treats a newly asserted basic right, the right to water, endorsed as recently as 
2002 by the UN Committee on Human Rights, as an implied even if not explicitly specified 
requirement for fulfilment of article 11 of the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. Bleisch summarises the reasoning that led to this judgement and 
defends it against objections. It has remained ambiguous so far whether the right to water 
concerns domestic water only or also productive water, e.g. for irrigation. Bleisch argues that 
whereas a right to domestic water might be justified quite easily this is not the case with 
productive water as part of a broader concept of welfare rights. One objection against such 
rights will be that there is no meaningful right until there are specified counterpart 
responsibilities. A sister objection is that such additional responsibilities cannot be imposed 
on already overburdened governments. As Bleisch observes, Uganda is one of the few 
countries whose national constitution in fact includes a right to water. Yet a Commissioner in 
the Uganda Commission for Human Rights remarked at Bleisch’s conference presentation 
that she had not heard of this alleged right and did not welcome its assertion when so many 
other rights were far from fulfilment. 
 
Such a right has roles besides and before establishing a claim for public provision. Vitally, it 
establishes a duty not to harm other people’s access to basic domestic water supply, and a 
duty on the State to prevent and penalise such infringement. It guides the State also in 
specifying the responsibilities of private providers that it commissions. By 2002-3 three giant 
French corporations had gained control of around 75% of the new world market for 
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commercialised water supply: Vivendi, Suex, and Saur (AEFJN 2003). Hall reports a typical 
and revealing experience, and draws out its significance: 
 
“In 1999, Mozambique gave Aguas de Moçambique, a concession for 5 years in the 
cities of Beira, Dondo, Quelimane, Nampula and Pemba, and for 15 years 
management of water services in Maputo and Matola. … However, the catastrophic 
floods in the year 2000 wrecked many of the water supply installations… The 
consortium’s financial plans had been based on rapidly increasing the amount of 
water sold, but such expansion now proved impossible and the company took heavy 
losses in 2000…. Saur, with 38.5% of the shares, wanted to declare Aguas de 
Moçambique bankrupt at the end of 2001, which would have reduced the liability of 
the parent company. However, other shareholders—Aguas do Portugal and the 
Mozambican companies—disagreed. Saur then left, selling its shares to the others… 
In effect, Saur was unwilling for its shareholders to carry any of the extra liability 
that Mozambique’s water services had to face after the floods. (Hall 2006: 2-3) 
“The problems with the corporate behaviour partly stem from their wish to avoid the 
risk of having to pay for events which are unforeseen, or at least uncertain. … 
[whereas] one of the characteristics of public services is that they should protect 
citizens from a range of risks–environmental, health, economic–and do so by 
accepting a collective sharing of risks through state mechanisms. … Public 
authorities are expected to assume the responsibility for these risks. … [In contrast] 
risk avoidance is of quantifiable value to the private sector” (Hall 2006: 8).  
 
Insofar as risk-sharing and burden-spreading are fundamental values in public services, and 
insofar as commercial corporations in the world market are not capable of diverging far from 
profit-maximization, then either governments must subsidize corporate public service 
providers—somehow anticipating all the cases where corporations will otherwise evade 
providing services—or provide services themselves, or arrange them in some other way; 
unless corporations conclude that long-run profit maximization requires shorter- and 
medium-run investments in societal decency and sustainability. 
 
Banerjee, a medical doctor, looks at the comparable issues of responsibility for essential 
drugs, and Kreide considers specifically corporations’ responsibilities, especially 
transnational corporations’ transnational obligations. Banerjee looks with favour on the idea 
that: “…the pharmaceutical industry possesses…[such] special knowledge [that] bears so 
directly and centrally on human well-being, [that] it is constrained by special moral 
requirements to apply its knowledge in ways that benefit the rest of the society, and 
therefore…the drug industry should be viewed differently to other industries” (Banerjee, 
p.8). “Drug access for poor people in the developing world is a greater moral responsibility 
than a responsibility to shareholders to obtain marginally higher profits” (Banerjee, p.11). 
These moral arguments probably need to be supplemented by an understanding that 
marginally higher profits not derived in a morally balanced way are unlikely to be 
sustainable. Banerjee systematically discusses also the respective responsibilities of 
governments, other organisations, local communities, and sick and at-risk individuals and 
their families. He concludes: “Governments and the pharmaceutical industry have the 
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greatest power to institute change in the structures which have most influence on drug access 
and so the greatest responsibility and response must be borne by these two players.” (p.29). 
 
In an interesting study of the distribution of responsibilities for managing the risks and 
damage associated with agricultural pesticide use in tropical countries, Karlsson (2007) notes 
three principles for allocating response-responsibilities: causal responsibility, response 
capacity, and concern. The weakness of the first principle is that available information and 
theory often do not suffice to ascertain respective causal responsibilities. Capacity and 
concern are both required for an allocation of response-responsibility to have good results; 
neither criterion without the other is likely to give effectiveness. Fortunately some of the 
most swollen beneficiaries of globalised “turbo-capitalism” (Luttwak’s term) have shown 
concern: including Gates, Buffet, Turner and Soros. The first two, as Bannerjee notes, have 
made massive resources available to support access to essential drugs. Preferably more such 
moguls, including some of Third World origin like Lakshmi Mittal, will join these ranks 
rather than conduct fantasy escapades such as wedding revels in Versailles – escapades for 
which their names might be remembered with contempt not the respect that they seek. 
 
Kreide’s paper follows a similar line of reasoning to Karlsson, in the present-day setting 
where “Private collectives in particular have gained increasing prominence in international 
negotiations, public deliberation, and rule-setting” (Kreide p.1). While Banerjee’s treatment 
of responsibilities does not directly confront the issue of how far responsibilities cross 
national boundaries, this question is addressed by Kreide. Compared to a generation ago 
however, when national boundaries were typically treated as presumptively massive moral 
divides, these two papers and Bleisch’s reflect the impacts of enormously increased 
international interpenetration and transnational arrangements, and the growing strength of a 
global human rights regime. 
 
 
5. TEACHING, RESEARCH AND ADVOCACY IN ETHICS  
 
Goulet remarked that: “Planners and other intellectuals find it so difficult to create a true 
professional ethic because they are crafters of words, ideas, and models. Consequently, they 
are timid about plunging into the heartland reality of ethics as existential power, and not as 
moral verbalism or conceptualism. Ethicists themselves constantly vacillate between ethical 
paralysis or compromise in the face of power, and energetic creativity newly released 
whenever they catch a faint glimpse of the power of ethics itself. …  the power of ethics to 
counter the power of wealth, of politics, of bureaucratic inertia, of defeatism, of social 
pathology. Such power can be won by a Gandhi, a Martin Luther King, a Danilo Dolci; it 
can never be institutionalized. But those others who lack ethical grandeur will inevitably lose 
hope in the face of larger powers, and accept compromises which strip their own ethics of its 
latent power.” (Goulet 1976: 40-41). Inspirational leadership only succeeds though in certain 
circumstances; and is sometimes disastrously misguided. Leaders need a combination of a 
favourable conjuncture, capable supporters, strong networks and relevant practicable 
proposals, in addition to some inspiring vision (Gasper 2007). 
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Goulet himself may understandably have sometimes become dispirited in the era of 
Reaganism, Islamism, born-again Protestantism, the suppression of liberation theology and 
the retreat from Vatican II, and of tragedies and disappointments in some countries he had 
engaged with closely such as Sri Lanka or Guinea-Bissau. He constantly reiterated however, 
through to perhaps his final published paragraph, that “the primary mission of development 
ethics…is to keep hope alive” (Goulet 2006b: 120). 
 
How? Three interconnected means are: incorporation in movements, incorporation in 
methods, and incorporation in education and training. Development ethics can seek in these 
ways to become, in another of Goulet’s key phrases, “the means of the means”, incorporated 
in and influencing the means of action: professionals, organisations, techniques and 
procedures, legislatures, courts and even public water supply companies.   
 
Education and training 
Ethics teaching, whether to practitioners or non-practitioners, is not easy to make effective 
and fruitful. Camacho’s paper illustrates a practical approach – not trying to enforce any 
single doctrine, but providing a space for attention, heightened awareness and a process of 
joint reflection. From a case study of training for professionals in Costa Rica’s state water 
corporation he suggests some steps as worthwhile for intra-organisation training seminars: 
1. Review the state of the organisation (Section 3 and 4), with an onus on participant 
self-review and then joint review of the identified problems and of causes and 
possible responses 
2. Pay special attention to user complaints (Sections 4.4 and 5) 
3. Present theories in relation to such cases, not in the abstract (Section 4) 
4. Use multi-media to convey reality and relevance (Section 5) 
5. Pay special attention to the relevant laws and regulations (Section 5); examine, as 
one starting point, the authorisation established by the laws (Section 6). 
Giddy adds that if training is to have much effect on behaviour it should attend to ethos and 
attitudes. He makes us ask: how to teach the virtues? 
 
The range of issues covered in training will depend on the mandate and function of the 
organisation. In some cases attention to international dimensions could be obligatory. In 
nearly all cases the theme of setting ethical boundaries to markets would be germane, asking 
what should be a commodity and to what degree, and what should not be for sale. One can 
ask these questions for a range of instances, from what are in principle undisputed cases—
such as life or judicial and administrative decisions—to actively disputed ones, such as 
military force or drinking water.  
 
Camacho uses the water company’s language of “customer”. The right to water in Costa 
Rica is explicit, but it is only a right to obtain water at a “reasonable” price, and even in this 
middle-income country it is not fully achieved. The language of human rights is not 
highlighted in the training seminar he describes. Some might say that such issues belong at 
Ministry level rather than implementing agency level. Many issues are indeed matters of 
strategy, policy, major investment or legal revision, rather than of identifying and balancing 
different values in matters of daily operation. It would be bizarre though if a national 
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commitment to a right to water existed but was not absorbed into the ethos of the main water 
agency and was instead outweighed and nullified there by other values (cf. Stravato, 2005).  
 
In South Africa a constitutional right to water now exists but is not yet fulfilled. Nor in 
recent years were essential drugs assured to HIV-AIDS sufferers, at the same time that 
immense outlays were made on the South African navy (sic), to the considerable financial 
gain of people very close to senior politicians. The broader-ranging training that is possible 
in contexts like universities should emphasise then that a preoccupation with legal provisions 
is insufficient and can be dangerous if it restricts effective redress to those people most able 
to hire expensive lawyers and access the courts. Social movements to bring pressure on 
governments and raise consciousness within the legal system are an essential counterforce. 
Responding to such a social movement, the courts in South Africa in 2001 used right-to-
health and right-to-life arguments to oblige the government to allocate funds to HIV-AIDS 
drug provision. Both elements proved essential: the established constitutional provisions, and 
the social pressure to establish and then apply them. 
 
The issues of power and  motivation which are so evident in the more situated, worldly, 
professional ethics literature must thus also be present in policy ethics teaching and research. 
Just as professional ethics must engage with anthropology, psychology and organizational 
behaviour, so policy ethics must engage with political science, economics, inter-
organizational studies and international relations.  
 
Gasper’s paper “What is the Point of Development Ethics?” complements Camacho’s on 
professional ethics training. It takes up a series of basic issues to be considered in trying to 
justify attention to policy- and professional ethics, including in education and training. Is 
ethics epistemologically futile? If not, is it epistemologically possible but obvious, a matter 
of common sense? Or epistemologically possible in principle but sterile in practice? Or, 
epistemologically possible in principle but politically irrelevant? How can it achieve more 
influence? The paper sketches both a methodological, meta-ethical framework, and a 
descriptive-explanatory treatment of ways and conditions in which ethics can influence 
policy and personal behaviours and how such influence can be promoted. It introduces part 
of the agenda required for consolidating development ethics as a useful and lively field of 
research and practice. 
 
Methods of policy analysis 
Incorporation in methods is a vital part of institutionalisation. Goulet’s perspective has 
perhaps not yet become sufficiently embodied in methods and methodologies. He was well 
aware of the central importance of how routine operation is structured, as seen in his later 
work on indicators (e.g. Goulet, 1992c), but was not fond of formalisms and formalised 
frameworks. Yet these are often the paths and instruments for influence. Various of his ideas 
that were shared by others have become embedded by them in relevant methodologies. His 
type of value-focused approach to local investigation and action has grown in the work led 
by Robert Chambers and others. His approach to policy ethics is close to the value-critical 
policy analysis of Martin Rein (1976), Frank Fischer (1980, 1995), Ronald Schmidt (2006) 
and others, which has been elaborated and applied quite extensively. Schmidt provides a 
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concise and lucid overview. His proposed approach to development cooperation has lately 
been greatly advanced by David Ellerman (2005) amongst others. 
 
Social movements 
Incorporation in movements is essential for change. Here, Goulet’s insistence on evolution 
from tradition, domestically, and on a separate specialism or sub-discipline of ‘development 
ethicists’, who should be added to decision-making in development policy and practice, 
formed an uneasy combination. Where would a sub-discipline emerge except in North 
America where philosophical ethics is an enterprise on sufficient scale, in terms of numbers 
of courses and students and academics, for such a specialism to receive sustained attention? 
And what role would such implicitly expatriate or relatively distanced ethicists have in 
relation to domestic traditions? Goulet drew the parallel with specialist business and medical 
ethical advisors (1988: 160-2). In my view, the paths of trying to influence methods, other 
specialists and social movements appear more relevant: in order to enrich and modify others’ 
work, and become a means of the means. 
 
The international human rights movement or movements tries to institutionalize ideas of 
great existential power. Goulet had mixed feelings however about its generalizing and 
sometimes rather Eurocentric vision (Goulet, 1984). While sympathetic to the UNDP-led 
movements of “human development” and to movements of participatory research and action, 
his active personal affiliation and quest for potential partners appears instead to have been 
especially within movements of progressive Christian thinking. Here the 1980s and 1990s 
were perhaps times of retrogression instead. Compared to the 1970s Goulet’s influence 
declined, in the absence of vehicles—organizations, journals, a readily encapsulated 
methodology, a related movement—that could extend, apply and adapt his approach. The 
model of a Parisian prophet, dissemination of whose ideas looks after itself thanks to their 
elegance and power and the presence of a large waiting audience, rarely works on a wider 
stage. Two of the key audiences were remote, physically or psychologically: movements of 
the poor living far away, and the Northern rich, asked to reflect about their riches and about 
their relations to the distant poor.  
 
I have suggested that Goulet’s distinctive strength came through his ethnographic and 
sociological approach rather than a modification of welfare economics or Western moral 
philosophy. Yet just as village ethics cannot suffice for more complex societies, so more 
elaborated, multi-part, dissociated and in some parts abstract, intellectual systems, methods 
and projects are also needed in analytical and practical ethics (Gasper 1996, 2000). Goulet’s 
type of work requires partnership with the streams derived from economics and 
philosophical ethics. We can aim to take forward his work in building an interdisciplinary 
field of development ethics that makes some difference, through more systematic 
incorporation of ideas into methods, movements and education.  
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